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This paper shows that the results of Venables (1987) depend critically on the assumption that there
are no fixed costs of trade. The introduction of fixed costs of exporting, while making the model more
consistent with the empirical evidence, leads to the opposite conclusion that technological progress
in one country cannot harm the welfare of its trading partner. However, the results can be obtained
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Abstract
This paper shows that the results of Venables (1987) depend critically on the assumption
that there are no ￿xed costs of trade. The introduction of ￿xed costs of exporting, while making
the model more consistent with the empirical evidence, leads to the opposite conclusion that
technological progress in one country cannot harm the welfare of its trading partner. However,
the results can be obtained in a richer setting with heterogeneous ￿rms.
Keywords: Technological progress, ￿xed costs of exporting.
1 Introduction
Venables (1987) studies the impact of di⁄erences in countries￿sizes and technologies on welfare as
well as the consequences of trade policies. He uses the standard monopolistic competition setting
with homogeneous ￿rms. A particularly interesting result obtained is that technological progress
in the monopolistically competitive industry in one country raises welfare there, but reduces it
abroad.1
Among the assumptions used by Venables (1987) to derive this result is that there are no ￿xed
costs associated with exporting: the only additional costs paid by ￿rms wishing to export are per-
unit costs such as those associated with transportation or trade policy. However, this assumption
is at odds with the empirical evidence, which shows that exporting ￿rms face signi￿cant ￿xed costs
associated with entry into export markets. (See, for instance, Roberts and Tybout (1997).) This
leads to the natural question whether adding such costs to the model changes its predictions. In
this note, we show that including the ￿xed costs of exporting into the model developed by Venables
(1987)2 eliminates the result mentioned above: in the presence of such costs, technological progress
in the monopolistically competitive industry in one country cannot result in welfare losses elsewhere.
￿Department of Economics, University of Georgia, 528 Brooks Hall, Athens, GA 30602. E-mail: demido-
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yDepartment of Economics, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, 16802. Email: kmk4@psu.edu.
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1See Proposition 3 on page 708 of the paper.
2We use the ideas from the model developed by Venables (1987) in the setting a la Melitz (2003).
12 The Model
There are two countries, home and foreign, each of which has the same number of workers, L:
Labor is assumed to be the only factor of production.3 Each country produces a homogeneous
good, N; under constant returns to scale, a unit input requirement of labor, and conditions of
perfect competition. The homogeneous good is chosen as the numeraire, which allows to normalize
the wage to unity in each country. In addition, each ￿rm in a country may produce a variety
of the di⁄erentiated good. Preferences are given by U = (N)
1￿￿ (Q)




￿1=￿ is the sub-utility from consuming q(v) units of each variety v when ￿ is the set
of available varieties of the di⁄erentiated good.4
Denote the domestic price of variety v produced in country i; i = H;F; by pi(v) and its exporting
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where Mii is the mass of domestic ￿rms in country i; and Mji is the mass of exporters from country
j to country i: As originally shown by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), the demand in countries i and j
for variety v produced in country i is, respectively,











In country i; the di⁄erentiated goods are produced by a continuum of identical ￿rms with the
same productivity level ’i and marginal cost 1
’i, i = H;F. Each ￿rm has two options: it can produce
for domestic market and/or export abroad.5 The ￿xed costs of these options are, respectively, f
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is pro￿t earned by an exporter from country i to country j:7 In particular,
￿i (’i;Pi) = pi (’i)qi (’i) ￿
qi (’i)
’i















3Introducing di⁄erences in countries￿size would not change the results, but complicates the analysis.
4Note that Venables (1987) considers a more general case, when U = U (N;Q): In other words, he requires only
the separability of the utility function between the numeraire commodity and the di⁄erentiated goods. We chose to
specify the utility function to simplify the analysis. Our conclusions are una⁄ected by this simpli￿cation.
5Note that since ￿rms in each country are the same, either all ￿rms use the option or none of them does.
6The introduction of the di⁄erences in the ￿xed costs between countries does not change the results.
7It is easy to show that pro￿ts earned by an exporter from country i to country j with productivity level ’i equal
to pro￿ts earned by a domestic ￿rm from country j with productivity level
’i
￿ :





























where ri (’;Pi) is the revenue earned by a domestic ￿rm from country i with productivity ’; and
Ei is the expenditures on the di⁄erentiated goods in country i; Ei = PiQi = ￿ (wL) = ￿L:8
2.1 The Logic of Venables (1987)
In Venables (1987) model, fx = 0: Thus, ￿rms export as long as they make positive variable pro￿ts
from the market. The crux of his argument can be seen from his Figure 1. This relates the price
indices in the two countries to free entry condition for their ￿rms. For each country, a unit decrease
in the home price index (which reduces pro￿tability in the home market) must be compensated for
by more than a unit increase in the foreign price index to keep pro￿ts at zero. This is the case as
transport costs make the home market more important than the foreign one. The intersection of
these two zero pro￿t conditions pins down the number of ￿rms in each market.
Now consider an improvement in productivity on the part of home ￿rms. Due to this, their
ability to make pro￿ts is enhanced and their free entry line shifts inwards. But this reduces the
price index at Home and raises it abroad as the other free entry line is downward sloping! But
a higher price index abroad reduces foreign welfare and a lower price index at Home raises home
welfare. The intuition is that higher domestic productivity makes Home a better place to locate so
entry rises at home and falls abroad. Because of transport costs, this is good for Home consumers
and bad for foreign ones as consumers get more from domestic ￿rms than foreign ones.
3 The Equilibrium with Fixed Costs of Exporting
Now consider what the addition of ￿xed costs of exporting does. Firms can choose to export,
to export and produce domestically, to only produce domestically, or not to produce any of the
di⁄erentiated goods. Given free entry in each country and each market, pro￿ts from choosing any
option cannot exceed zero. Thus, we can write four sets of conditions which de￿ne the equilibrium:











MHF = 0; (4)











MFH = 0: (6)
These are the familiar zero pro￿t and complementary slackness conditions. If pro￿ts are positive,
entry will occur and compete these pro￿ts away. If ￿rms at Home sell in the domestic market
(MHH > 0), then ￿H (’H;PH) must be zero. If pro￿ts are negative, then MHH = 0: Similarly for
the other three sets of conditions.
8Note that due to free entry, consumers￿income in country i is equal to labor payments, wL; which is equal to L;
since wage w is normalized to 1 by the choice of the numeraire commodity.
























































Note that if ￿rms from both countries sell in the home country￿ s market, i.e., MHH > 0 and








’F = A￿1’F; (7)





: This is depicted by the straight line below the 45 degree line when A > 1
in Figure 1 and by the straight line above the 45 degree line when A < 1 in Figure 2. In Figure 1,
the line is below the 45 degree one as foreign ￿rms need to be quite productive to make up for the
disadvantages they face in the home market: namely, the high ￿xed costs of exports and transport
costs. In Figure 2, the line is above the 45 degree one as foreign ￿rms can be relatively unproductive
and still export to the home market since ￿xed costs of exports are low.
Above the line given by (7), home productivity is so high than foreign ￿rms cannot make up
this disadvantage and do not sell abroad but home ￿rms sell in their domestic market. Below this
line, foreign ￿rms sell in the home market, but home ￿rms cannot sell in their own market.
Similarly, if ￿rms from both countries sell in the foreign country￿ s market, i.e., MFF > 0 and








’F = A’F: (8)
This is depicted by the straight line above the 45 degree line when A > 1 in Figure 1 and by
the straight line below the 45 degree line when A < 1 in Figure 2. In Figure 1, the line is above
the 45 degree one as home ￿rms need to be quite productive to make up for the disadvantages they
face in the foreign market: namely, the high ￿xed costs of exports and transport costs. In Figure
2; the low ￿xed cost of exporting give them an advantage in the foreign market and they need not

























































Above the line given by (8), home productivity is so high that home ￿rms can sell in the foreign
market but foreign ￿rms cannot sell there. Below this line, foreign ￿rms sell in the foreign market,
but home ￿rms cannot sell abroad. These arguments allow us to label the di⁄erent regions in Figures
1 and 2 as done.
If A > 1, the costs of exporting are high relative to the cost of production for the domestic
market, i.e., it is easier to become a domestic producer than to be an exporter, so that no ￿rm
exports its variety of the di⁄erentiated good without selling it in the domestic market. If A < 1;
the costs of producing for the domestic market are higher than those of exporting, so that no ￿rm
produces a di⁄erentiated good domestically without exporting it abroad.9
To complete the analysis, assume that A = 1: In this case only when ’H = ’F; is it possible
for both countries to produce di⁄erentiated goods. If there are productivity di⁄erences, the less
productive country specializes in the homogeneous good.
4 Technological Progress and Welfare






What happens to it when the technological progress in the di⁄erentiated good sector occurs in the
home country, i.e., if ’H rises?
9Note that since the second case is at odds with the empirical evidence, we can make the usual assumption that
costs of exporting are high enough so that exporters always produce for the domestic market. We chose not to do so
to derive more general results.
5If A > 1, an increase in ’H cannot not reduce welfare in the foreign country. If ’H < A’F, the
foreign country is the only producer of the di⁄erentiated goods so that an increase in ’H has no
e⁄ect on the price index in the foreign country, and hence, no e⁄ect on its welfare or on the welfare
of the home country. If ’H > A’F; the home country is the only producer of the di⁄erentiated
goods and an increase in ’H reduces the price index in the home and foreign countries, and hence,
raises their welfare: Similar arguments can be made to show that there are no welfare losses at
Home or abroad if A ￿ 1: As a result, we can conclude that technological progress in any country
cannot reduce welfare of its trading partner.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that the results obtained by Venables (1987) strongly depend on his
assumption that there are no ￿xed costs of trade. The introduction of ￿xed costs of exporting, while
making the model more consistent with the empirical evidence, leads to the opposite conclusion that
technological progress in one country cannot harm the welfare of its trading partner. However, his
results can be obtained in a richer model. Demidova (2005) shows that technological progress in one
country can lead to welfare losses abroad, if we relax the assumption that ￿rms are homogeneous,
and allow for ￿rm heterogeneity as in Melitz (2003).
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